This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety overinvestment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.
Introduction
Guaranteeing products' safety to consumers is challenging for many industries offering products such as aircrafts, cars, bridges, machine tools, food, and drugs (…). The uncertainty arises as a result of practical matters such as a producer's inability to strictly control all of the inputs or processes that determine the safety of a manufactured product. Lack of care in design or manufacture of goods often results in failures of these goods. Monitoring the entire supply chain is obviously costly; ineffectual monitoring or half measures can lead to flaws in quality/safety controls.
The economics literature posits that regulations involving large compliance costs should be restricted to cases in which market-based mechanisms lead to an insufficient provision of product safety (see, for instance, Viscusi et al., 1995) . It is generally recognized that it is rarely possible or economically feasible to achieve zero risk with respect to safety, even if such a conclusion is not always publicly accepted.
1 Empirical evidence shows that markets do not always provide an adequate level of safety. Risk assessment requires scientific knowledge or/and complex tests, unaffordable for consumers and even sometimes for firms or professionals, particularly for long-term risks. 2 For instance, after a 14-year ban due to health risks, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently approved revamped silicone breast implants because of compelling scientific evidence (Rundle and Mathews, 2006 ).
In such a context, regulatory interventions and agencies such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (…) have strong economic support, despite risks of inefficiency and bureaucracy. In particular, approval process, standards, auditing, inspection and certification, and prosecutions and sanctions on 1 The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration set up federal safety standards with which "the public is protected against unreasonable risk of crashes occurring as a result of the design, construction, or performance of motor vehicles and is also protected against unreasonable risk of death or injury in the event crashes do occur" (see the Department of Transport, 2006, p. 1) . "Unreasonable" risk does not mean zero risk. 2 Safety may be divided into experience and credence characteristics. With an experience characteristic (Nelson, 1970) , a consumer discovers quality only after consuming it, and with a credence characteristic (Darby and Karni, 1973) a consumer never discovers the quality of the good (or does so only in the very long term, such as in the case of some long-term diseases or a better life expectancy). Because buyers have difficulty detecting both the effective level of safety and efforts by firms, credence goods are a somewhat particular case of experience goods, whereby the lag between purchase/consumption and quality detection tends toward infinity. In practice, many goods fall into the "credence" category.
fraudulent firms help maintain consumers' trust. In 2005, the US federal regulatory agencies for social and safety regulations spent $37.2 billion (Dudley and Warren, 2006) , in order to reduce both damages and probabilities of exposure to risks (such as the ones given in table 1, p. 124, in Viscusi, 1996) .
Despite private and regulatory efforts, some dangerous products may be offered willynilly on the market, as the two following examples suggest. First, some scientific studies recently linked use of Merck & Co.'s painkiller Vioxx with increased risks of heart attacks and strokes among patients. This case underlined difficulties to fully eliminate risky products. A drug safety specialist mentioned that "new medicines should only go on the market once they are proven to be safe" (see Capell and Carey, 2005, p. 23) . The US government has responded by reinforcing both FDA's approval process and safety standards for sending strong signals to doctors and patients.
Second, safety sometimes varies significantly among cars. For instance, Status Report (2003, p. 5) provides side impact crash tests and frontal offset crash tests for 12 small SUVs. 3 On a 4-point scale with 4 meaning good and 1 meaning poor, the averages for side impact crash tests and frontal offset crash tests are respectively 1.83 and 3.33 (standard deviations are respectively 1.19 and 0.77). Moreover, the correlation between these two tests is almost insignificant (-0.03), which means that informed consumers may be embarrassed for using these two tests in their purchase decisions. 4 Even if there are many sources of information about car safety, such as
Consumer Reports (2006) or the free Safercar website (Safercar, 2006) , safety awareness and risk perception are heterogeneous among consumers, since the 12 SUVs tested by Status Report (2003) had positive market shares in the US.
The previous examples raise the issues of both consumers' information and an "acceptable" level of safety. This paper examines firms' strategies and regulatory decisions when safety is at stake under different configurations of information. We seek to answer the question:
How does a safety standard influence market mechanisms?
3 Sometimes, information revealed to consumers is sufficient for eliminating dangerous products. For instance, sales of the Chevrolet Corvair Monza (1966) were hit by well-known activist Ralph Nader's book Unsafe at Any Speed (1966) . One chapter of this book claimed that this car was dangerously unstable and responsible for thousands of rollover accidents in the US. 4 Robertson (1996, p. 31) showed that in addition to federal standards, "increments in reduced death rates, attributable to additional improved vehicle crashworthiness, occurred during the period of publicized crash tests."
This paper considers two competing sellers who may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. In order to check robustness, both Bertrand and Cournot competitions are considered when producers face consumers.
Perfect and imperfect contexts of information for consumers are assumed for simplicity.
The available information about safety depends on consumers' search and trust, independent consumers' groups, publications such as Consumer Reports, firms' advertising, guarantees, labelling, and regulation and/or liability systems. 5 As it is impossible to detail all previous strategies, only two polar information contexts are studied without focusing on information revelation/acquisition. 6 The perfect information case represents a situation in which a perfect certification process completes the safety standard, so that no dangerous products hit the shelves.
Under imperfect information, only the safety standard is used because of unreliable or expensive certification processes, which means that dangerous products can be sold despite the standard and efforts for reducing risks.
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The minimum safety standard (MSS) consists of determining a minimum level of care (influencing the safety probability) with which all sellers should comply in offering their products. The MSS is selected by a regulator seeking to maximize welfare defined by the sum of the sellers' profits and consumers' surplus. An MSS may also influence firms' exit because of relatively large costs of safety improvement.
5 Because certification/signaling processes differ in precision and cost, there are various situations of imperfect information in which consumers have more or less precise information about safety supplied by firms. The new technologies for detecting products quality/safety lead to different levels of precision. Firn (2004) notes that, for food safety, detection may be very precise, with technologies based on genetic code of food, which is costly to enforce. The endogenous certification choice will be detailed at the end of this paper. 6 Scientific information may also be very difficult to deliver to consumers in a credible manner. In the United States, the FDA broadcasted warnings for pregnant women in 2004 to avoid consumption of long-lived, predatory fish, such as tuna, shark, and swordfish. Because of a high level of methylmercury, these fish are considered dangerous to a developing fetus and to children. According to RealMercuryFacts (2006) , the US recommendation resulted in confusion; consumers had difficulty recalling species with a high content of mercury. An alternative choice would consist in not informing consumers and reinforcing the existing standards for fish, namely, reducing acceptable levels of mercury for fish sold in the market. 7 In our framework, MSS concerns care choices across the supply chain, while certification mainly concerns detection of product failure before consumer purchase. For instance, after the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks (or "Mad Cow" disease) in the nineties in Europe, a first regulatory option consisted of animal flour prohibition for feeding animals. The second option consisted of the previous option combined with a systematic use of prionics to test animals in slaughterhouses, aimed at the complete eradication of BSE before beef consumption. Compared to our model, the first option corresponds to an MSS limiting risks without a complete withdrawal of tainted products (i.e., imperfect information), while the second option corresponds to an MSS with perfect certification (i.e., perfect information).
This paper shows that the determination of market structure as part of safety regulation depends on the available information about safety. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected MSS increases the probability of offering safety and maintains competition. The MSS is compatible with competition since safety is recognized by consumers, which guarantees sufficient profits for covering the safety cost. Under Bertrand competition, the MSS always corrects a safety underinvestment by firms. Under Cournot competition, the MSS corrects a safety underinvestment by firms for a relatively large cost of safety improvement.
However, for a relatively low cost of safety improvement, the MSS is ineffective, since there is a safety overinvestment by firms compared to the socially optimal level. In other words, firms select a higher effort than the one that would maximize welfare.
Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, it is socially optimal (under Bertrand and Cournot competitions) to impose a standard that, except for a few cases, leads to a monopoly situation. The monopoly situation guarantees profits necessary to cover the cost for complying with the MSS. However, when the cost of safety improvement is very large, the MSS is useless in impeding the absence of trade à la Akerlof (1970) because of a large probability to get dangerous products.
The results of this paper differ from the enormous literature about regulation of product safety. Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) , Chan and Marino (1994) , Daughety and Reinganum (1995) , Marino (1995a,b and and Marette et al. (2000) focused on products' safety, whereby sellers try to limit the probability of harm and the consequence of a product's defects.
Product defects can be (perfectly or not) thwarted by a complex combination of ex ante safety standards and/or ex post liability (the negligence rule is a combination of both instruments).
Conversely, in this paper we focus only on the ex ante safety standard under various contexts of information. We show that the different types of market structure (duopoly or monopoly) linked to the MSS choice crucially depend on the available information.
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The results of this study also make important contributions to the vast literature on the minimum quality standard (MQS). The term MSS is preferred in this paper to the "classical" notion of MQS that applies to cases in which the lowest acceptable quality is controlled without 8 We also show that the overinvestment in safety under Cournot competition is not linked to the issue of the "judgment proof," meaning that an injurer is unable to pay some portion of the losses to victims under strict liability. Beard (1990) showed that, considering a strict liability rule, potentially insolvent injurers might over-invest in safety prevention.
any uncertainty by firms or regulators. First, the literature on MQS points toward a difference between Bertrand and Cournot competition under perfect information (see Valletti, 2000, and Jinji and Toshimitsu, 2004) . In particular, the MQS is not used under Cournot competition since it reduces welfare. Our paper differs from the previous results since the MQS is used under both
Bertrand and Cournot competition for improving the safety effort. However, for a relatively low cost of safety improvement under Cournot competiton, the MSS is ineffective (but never welfare decreasing), since there is a safety overinvestment by all firms.
Second, unlike the present paper, the existing literature on the MQS is based upon models considering only one context of information. A large part of this literature considers a context of perfect information about quality for consumers, as, for instance, in Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander (1995) , Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) , Scarpa (1998) , Lutz et al. (2000) , Valletti (2000), Garella (2006) and Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004) . Some other papers focus on the standard in a context of imperfect information for consumers, as in Leland (1979) , Garella and Petrakis (2006) , and Lapan and Moschini (2006) . Conversely, our paper compares the standard under perfect and imperfect information, which leads to the determination of different market structures (duopoly or monopoly). Maintaining competition is important under perfect information (as demonstrated by Ronnen, 1991) , but reducing the number of firms under imperfect information allows to mitigate the market failure. 9 In this paper, a frontier regarding the link between competition and regulation is delineated based on the consumer's information.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the stylized model.
Following that, both market equilibrium and regulatory choice are successively detailed under perfect information and imperfect information for consumers. The two last sections present some extensions and conclusions.
The Model
In this stylized framework, trade occurs in a single period, with two firms able to produce the good. The ability to offer safe products is determined by a combination of firms' effort and randomness. Firm i=1,2 offers either safe products or dangerous products. The firm's ability to reduce risks and offer safe products is dependent on the firm's care choice but is also to some degree uncertain.
For simplicity, we let the firm's effort be equivalent to the probability of a safe product emerging. (Making the probability a function of the effort just adds a degree of complication that is unnecessary for the point being made in this paper.) With a probability 0 1 i λ ≤ ≤ , firm i only offers safe products and with a probability (1 ) i λ − firm i only offers dangerous products. We assume that the care choice, namely, the effort to increase the probability of offering safe products, implies a cost equal to 2 / 2 i f λ with 0 f ≥ .
10 For simplicity, the marginal cost is zero whatever the safety.
Consumers are risk neutral and want to purchase only one unit of the good, and no consumer would knowingly purchase a dangerous product. 11 For a safe product, consumers have a willingness to pay equal to θs. They differ in their willingness to pay for the safety level s, which is described by the uniformly distributed parameter θ ∈ [0,1] (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978, and Shaked and Sutton, 1983) . The consumption of harmful products results in some disutility equal to d θ − . A consumer has an expected willingness to pay equal to
, where μ is the probability of purchasing safe products. The mass of those consumers is normalized at 1.
A consumer who buys one unit of the product at a price of p has an indirect utility equal
, consumers are ready to buy the product. The consumer indifferent between buying a product at price p and buying nothing is identified by the preference parameter
consumers do not buy the product and their surplus is zero.
12 The probability μ depends on sellers' efforts i λ and available information.
Two contexts of information for consumers are considered for simplicity. First, we study a situation of perfect information about safety, in which dangerous products are perfectly detected before consumers' purchases. Then, we examine situations of imperfect information in which consumers (a) only have information about the average safety effort selected by the two firms (namely, a common reputation for safety effort) or (b) have no information about any effort.
The timing of this game is divided into three stages. In period 1, the regulator chooses Once this cost is sunk, the safety level (s or -d) is determined at the beginning of period 3, and firms compete for business. In period 3, firms compete either in prices (Bertrand competition) or in quantities (Cournot competition). Each firm has the possibility of exiting the market by selecting no effort in period 2 and no price/quantity in period 3. In this case, there is no sale for this firm and there is a reduction in the number of competitors. This game is solved by backward 12 Results are robust with the demand given by Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) in equations (1) and (2) induction (i.e., subgame Nash equilibrium) under each information context. We now turn to the case under perfect information for consumers
The Minimum Safety Standard under Perfect Information for Consumers
In period 1, the MSS defining the effort (equal to the probability of getting safe products) is determined by taking into account the effort/exit decision in period 2 and the prices/quantities decisions in period 3. Recall that in period 3, the safety level is already determined for each firm and the cost is fixed.
As the game is solved by backward induction, period 3 is now detailed. As consumers are perfectly informed about safety, any firm with dangerous products is driven out of the market in (1, ) 2 / 9
In period 2, the efforts (equal to the probability of getting safe products) are determined by taking into account the decisions in period 3. Effort influences the cost 2 / 2 i f λ and determines the safety level. The situation with two firms in period 2 is presented before the situation with one firm in period 2.
Without any exit, two firms make some efforts. With a probability i j λ λ (respectively, 
By using 2 r cs with r=B,C for the Bertrand, Cournot competition and 1 cs defined above in (1), the expected consumers' surplus is
. By using equations given by (4), the expected welfare is
If one seller exits the market in period 2, the other firm offers safe products with a probability λ and dangerous products with a probability (1-λ ). In this case, the expected profits for the single firm offering products is
By using equations (1), the expected consumers' surplus is
The expected welfare under monopoly is then
Before detailing the precise results under Bertrand and Cournot competition, we sketch the regulator's choices.
Regulator's Choices
In period 1, the MSS defining the effort (equal to the probability of getting safe products) is determined by taking into account the effort/exit decision in period 2 and the prices/quantities decisions in period 3. A regulator may impose an MSS, ,1
MSS without exit in period 2
An MSS is compatible with a duopoly in period 2 if the firm's profits defined by (4) are positive 
with r=B,C for the Bertrand, Cournot competition, and such that ( , ) 0
For keeping duopoly in stage 2, the regulator maximizes welfare under the constraints 
The MSS is the socially optimal level exceeds the firm's private choices, r λ (recall from section 2 that an MSS is selected only if it is larger than private choices).
It is easy to show that effort levels given by (8), (9), and (10) 
The MSS The regulator compares the welfare under the three previous configurations for determining its choice in period 1. Based on the possible MSS defined above, the equilibrium welfares are compared for determining the best policy. The optimal choice for determining the MSS is now presented under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. This allows us to underline the difference between the firms' choices (based on profit maximization) and the socially optimal choice (based on welfare maximization).
Bertrand Competition
If both firms offer safe products under Bertrand competition, profits and consumers' surplus are given by (2). By using (9) and (10) Proposition 1 means that it is always optimal to select an MSS for f > 0. The MSS imposes a higher effort to both firms by preserving competition in period 2. Figure 1 is useful for illustrating the regulatory choice of proposition 1 by using the notations defined in this proposition. The cost parameter, f, is located along the horizontal axis, and the effort level, λ , is located along the vertical axis. The value of f influences the regulator's optimal strategy. The plain curve is the selected MSS. The dash curve is the socially optimal level (that cannot be selected for preserving the competition). The level preserving competition, The MSS aims at keeping a competitive structure and increasing the level of effort. For relatively large values of the cost parameter, f f > , the selected MSS , s B λ is compatible with two firms on the market.
Cournot Competition
If both firms offer safe products under Cournot competition, profits and consumers' surplus are given by (3). By using (8) and (10) with r=C for the Cournot competition, the optimal choice for determining the MSS is presented in proposition 2 (see the appendix for the proof and the detailed values).
Proposition 2. Under Cournot competition and perfect information, the regulatory choice is as
follows:
the absence of MSS, since the MSS would be equal to the private firms' choice (equal to 1).
( 
The Minimum Safety Standard under Imperfect Information for Consumers
For simplicity, we briefly examine two situations of imperfect information in which consumers (a) only have information about the average safety effort selected by the two firms (namely, a common reputation for safety effort) or (b) have no information about any effort. As the MSS, 0 s λ ≥ , is known by all firms and consumers, it may influence the expected level of safety that affects consumers' willingness to pay.
14 The MSS can be used for modifying efforts without a complete withdrawal of dangerous products because of unreliable or expensive certification.
Information about Average Safety Effort
This situation of knowledge about average safety efforts corresponds to the situation in which an 14 Leland (1979) and Garella and Petrakis (2006) also consider a situation in which an MQS informs consumers.
One extension could be to consider an MSS s λ ε + that imperfectly informs consumers with a disturbance ε generated by a random process. The social benefits of imposing an MSS in proposition 3 would be diminished by considering an MSS that imperfectly signals quality to consumers.
industry has a common reputation about safety without any possibility of individual signals (see Tirole, 1996, and Carriquiry and Babcock, 2004) . The entire industry can lose consumers' trust as a result of actions of one participant. In other words, consumers are somewhat informed but not perfectly informed about individual safety efforts. 15 We consider a situation in which only + (equivalent to an expected safety 0 s > ), consumers are ready to buy products. As safety is not detected before purchasing, no firm leaves the market at period 3. We restrict our attention to the Cournot competition. By using notations from section 2, the inverse demand is equal to ( ) case, results would be close to the ones presented by Ronnen (1991) , Valletti (2000) , and Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004) . Under asymmetric information about this level of effort, the possibility for each firm to signal its level of effort (equal to the probability of offering safe products) would be similar to ones presented by Daughety and Reinganum (1997) .
maximization of these profits leads to equilibrium individual quantity 1/ 3 and to a price 
In particular, an MSS of 
The expected welfare is
As in the previous section, three configurations are taken into account by the regulator, namely, an MSS with no exit in period 2, an MSS leading to exit in period 2, and the absence of an MSS. The equilibrium welfare with and without MSS are compared for determining the best policy. Proposition 3 describes the regulator's choice (see the appendix for the proof and the detailed values). 
Proposition 3. Under Cournot competition and information about the average safety effort, the regulatory choice is as follows: (i) If

Extensions
In order to focus on the main economic mechanisms and to keep the mathematical aspects as simple as possible, our analytical framework was admittedly simple. In order to fit different problems coming from various contexts, some extensions could be integrated into the model presented here.
(1) For simplicity, we assumed a regulatory/inspection cost equal to zero, even if imposing an MSS is obviously costly to monitor. The product's approval process is generally very costly for both agencies and firms. Without audit or inspection, the regulator will rarely have as accurate information as the firm with respect to the effort for getting safety. Depending on the cost of firms' inspection, the regulator has to determine the number of inspections, the penalty for absence of compliance, and the way to finance such a policy (see Marette and Crespi, 2005) .
Clearly, the social benefits of imposing an MSS in proposition 1 would be diminished by taking into account the cost of regulation. For relatively large values of regulatory cost, the absence of MSS may become optimal.
(2) The choice regarding the private/public certification influencing the context of information for consumers could also be endogenous. The difference between these two contexts of information represents a difference of certification intensity, where the auditing, inspection and certification, differ and are obviously costly. For instance, in a context of no initial information for consumers, a product certification process guaranteeing that no dangerous products will hit the shelves is equivalent to a situation of perfect information described in Obviously, the cost of certification will diminish its advantages. Consider for instance that each firm incurs a certification fixed cost C guaranteeing that no dangerous products will hit the shelves. 18 The ability to incur this cost C would challenge the possibility to impose an MSS.
Using equation (4), the profit under duopoly with certification would be rewritten as benefit from certification. If C was very large, the certification would not be socially profitable and proposition 3 would apply. Alternatively, a sanction/liability system (not studied in this paper) that would perfectly reimburse consumers injured by dangerous products would also be equivalent to the case of perfect information studied in section 3.
(3) In section 4, we abstracted from safety signaling (via prices, guarantees, brand investment) and reputation in a context of repeat purchases under imperfect information. One strand of the asymmetric information literature concerns the sellers' ability to signal safety via prices, advertising, or guarantees or via the liability/regulation (see Daughety and Reinganum, 1997) . Safety signalling was omitted from the present model for at least three reasons. First, the constraints required to prove the existence of separating/pooling equilibria (under monopoly and duopoly) would make it very difficult, if not impossible, to consider the choices of exit/entry by firms (see for instance Marette et al., 2000 , for a safety signalling under monopoly only).
Second, rational expectations about safety require consumers to know all parameters (common knowledge) in signalling models, a requirement very unlikely to be met in the presence of contexts in which safety also involves scientific expertise and/or complex experiments. Third, inclusion of signaling would require either repeat purchases (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) or significantly restrictive assumptions on marginal cost (e.g., Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) , mainly in a monopolistic context. 19 However, as noted in note 2 of this paper, repeat purchases may lead to no new information for consumers since safety of a good could be revealed in the very long term, which ruins the possibility of signals or reputation.
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(4) Throughout the model, we assumed that the regulator was acting in the public's best interest. One stumbling block for such regulatory "fairness" is the efficiency of the public regulatory authority itself. Public agencies may be doomed to failure (i) if their mandate is not clearly defined, (ii) if they suffer from excessive bureaucracy, or (iii) if the industrial lobby's influence creates lax regulation. A regulator may sometimes choose more than the necessary amount of regulation with very large MSSs, depending on the incumbent's influences upon the agency. Kim (1997) underscores how regulation is suboptimal when an incumbent behaves strategically against the government (the regulator, as a follower, deters entry by newcomers, protecting the incumbent's oligopoly situation), an aspect we do not consider here. The standard can be a potential barrier to innovation (Maxwell, 1998, and Garella, 2006) or to entry (Lutz, 2000) . Lutz et al. (2000) showed that if the high-quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated, it induces the regulator to weaken standards, and welfare falls. Further, the absence of restriction in the number of firms leading to a duopoly (in propositions 1 and 2) needs to be mitigated with respect to the government's ability to collect information regarding parameters such as firms' fixed costs and market demand. 19 Milgrom and Roberts showed that conspicuous spending is essential for signaling high quality in a monopolistic context, whereas Bagwell and Riordan demonstrated that a monopolist would resort to positive price distortions (relative to the price prevailing under perfect information) to signal high quality. Along such lines, the present model could be extended by allowing part of the cost to consist of conspicuous spending and signaling with two competing firms. 20 Under perfect information, results under repeat purchases can be replicated from equation (4) (5) Government regulation is not the only approach deserving consideration, with measures ranging from voluntary practice, codes of good conduct, "private" MSS, and market incentives as reputation mechanisms or quality/safety signaling. One extension that is of interest concerns that of a voluntary standard/certification system in which each firm decides whether or not to comply with it. Self-regulation by professions fixing MSS could also be studied (see Andrews, 2002 ).
(6) We could expand the number of firms in our market or introduce multi-product firms.
In particular, the results with three firms competing would be very close to the results of propositions 1 and 2. The regulator would calibrate the MSS to allow the presence of the three firms on the market under perfect information. The results of proposition 3 hold for contexts of imperfect information. The assumption of homogeneous producers may be considered unrealistic. However, allowing for heterogeneous producers would significantly lengthen the paper and would divert attention into numerous modelling details.
Conclusion
Using a very stylized framework, various mechanisms were illustrated by which the structure of consumers' information and producers' competition may influence the provision of product safety. Because the effect of consumers' information and regulatory policy are intermingled, different contexts of information were considered. This stylized framework made it possible to infer some stylized economic mechanisms that are valid in various realistic situations.
By focusing on safety, the paper led to new results. Results are not trivial when the information structure for consumers varies. The results are novel by directly considering the probability of getting safety under different consumers' information contexts, the MSS, and the exit/entry considerations. The MSS under perfect information about safety is compatible with competition, which is not the case under imperfect information. Clearly, the MSS under imperfect information entails competition restriction.
This simple model suggests that it is especially imperative for governments to examine not only the types of regulations imposed upon an industry but also both information context and competitive structure (including the firms' profitability influencing the exit/entry). These results mean that a regulator should also focus on both consumers' information and competitive structures, and not only on risk assessment, when an MSS is imposed.
Proof of proposition 1.
The different levels of efforts (8), (9), (10) and the corresponding equilibrium welfare are detailed with r=B for the Bertrand competition and by using equation (2). By using (5) 
By using (5) and (9), the value 
We now turn to the welfare comparison. First, both strict inequalities QED.
Proof of proposition 2.
The different levels of efforts (8), (9), (10) and the corresponding equilibrium welfare are detailed with r=C for the Cournot competition and by using equation (3). By using (5) 
By using (5) and (10), the socially optimal effort 
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The private choice by firms is equal to one for 1 / 9 f f s < = and the socially optimal effort is one for 5 / 72 f s < . By using (5), an effort equal to one leads to the equilibrium welfare (1,1) 4 / 9
The private choice C λ is greater (respectively lower) than the socially optimal choice (ii QED.
Proof of proposition 3.
Under duopoly in period 2, the maximization of profits given by (12) 
